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Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, reforms of 
the security sector, and especially civil-military relations, have been a priority for the 
government. In this period of more than a decade, the powers, autonomy and functions of key 
institutions in the security sector have been redefined with legal amendments. Some of the 
reforms in the area of civil-military relations brought the Turkish legal structure close to a 
democratic framework. The reforms, along with major observable changes in the behavioural 
patterns of military officers, gave the impression that the armed forces were out of politics 
and subjugated to civilian powerholders.  
Yet, the events of the night of 15 July 2016, when Turkey experienced an 
unanticipated coup attempt against the elected government, defied the conclusion that the 
military was out of politics. The attempt, in many respects, was the first of its kind in Turkish 
history. The plotters detained their commanders, including the chief of the general staff, 
fought against their own comrades with firearms, shot and killed unarmed civilians, and 
bombed the national parliament, police headquarters and the offices of the intelligence 
agency. The putschists surrendered to government forces within approximately 13 hours, but 
inflicted unprecedented damage before doing so.   
How can we explain these extraordinary events in light of the security sector reforms 
that were made in order to prevent the history of coups in Turkey from repeating itself? To 
answer this question this chapter analyses the changing security frameworks of the decade 
prior to the coup. Through the examination of developments in civil-military relations, 
intelligence and police services, it shows that the government created forces loyal to itself 
and the regime. It was the existence of these forces that ultimately led to the coup’s failure. In 
that sense, the changes of the past decade prevented a successful coup from taking place. 
However, it was also the events of the prior decade that sowed the seeds of the putsch by 
disturbing the existing balance of power between different groups and security institutions. In 
other words, the whole coup picture can be seen only by looking at the changes that have 
taken place in the security sector.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses developments 
from 2007 onwards, which influenced the legal framework of the security sector and the 
behaviour of the actors. The aim of this section is to show how these changes unintentionally 
paved the way for the failed coup. The second section provides an overview of the coup itself 
and outline how events unfolded during the 13 hours that Turkey was on tenterhooks. In the 
third section, the amendments that were introduced in the military and the intelligence agency 
immediately after the coup are examined. The chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
 
The Context Leading Up to the Failed Coup 
The set of events that led to the failed putsch can be traced back to 2007, a turning 
point in Turkish politics in many respects. This is the year that the AKP won the general 
elections for a second time and effectively defeated the secularist resistance in the military, 
judiciary and civil society. This is also the year after which the Islamist movement led by 
Fethullah Gülen became publicly visible in matters involving the security sector. This section 
outlines how relations between the Gülen movement and the AKP government (first as allies, 
then as lethal antagonists) has shaped and reshaped the military, the National Intelligence 
Agency (MİT) and the police.  
The Coup Plots and their Consequences for the Military   
One of the first operations that changed the Turkish security sector was the Ergenekon 
investigations, which began in 2007 and accused hundreds of military personnel and civilians 
of forming a terrorist organization and planning to stage a coup against the government 
(Kırkeser 2013). In 2010, another case sought to link more than 300 military officers with a 
coup plan called Balyoz (Sledgehammer) (Hürriyet 2012). The final investigation was the 
case of “military espionage”, accusing around 350 suspects with blackmailing, prostitution 
and sharing secret information with foreign services (Karataş 2013). In 2012 and 2013, the 
Specially Authorized Courts that tried the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases found around 600 
military and civilian suspects guilty and condemned them to prison sentences of various 
lengths. Among those that received life sentences were a former chief of the general staff and 
commanders of the armed forces (Usta and Erçiçek 2012; BBC Türkçe 2013). 
Later events, however, demonstrated that the coup investigations were carried out by 
public prosecutors and police officers who were alleged to be part of the Gülen movement. At 
first the AKP government gave its blessing to the cases despite reported irregularities. In its 
alliance with the Gülenists, the government aimed to curb the remaining political powers and 
prestige of the secular military. But after the December 2013 showdown between the AKP 
and the Gülen movement, the AKP changed its opinion and altered the fate of the 
investigations. In April 2015, all Balyoz suspects were re-tried and acquitted (Hürriyet 2015). 
In March 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the rights of a number of Ergenekon 
suspects were violated and released all suspects from prison. The Court of Appeals 
overturned the previous court decision, the cases began to be retried in June 2017 and 
formally closed in June 2018 (TRT Haber 2017; Saymaz 2018). Finally, all suspects were 
acquitted in the espionage case in February 2016 (Hürriyet 2016a).  
Despite the reversal of the decisions, the Turkish political system was modified in 
unprecedented ways through these investigations. First, the government switched sides on the 
cases in just a matter of a few years, politicizing a court matter, and thus damaging the basic 
principles of the rule of law and democracy. Second, in the overall domestic power structure, 
the military was rendered a mere shadow of its former self. In the post-1980 coup era, the 
armed forces had become a unified, secular, right-wing guardian of the Republic, supported 
by other secular citizens and institutions, such as the judiciary.1 By 2016, however, it was 
neither influential nor prestigious. It was also too timid to intervene in politics, not 
necessarily because of principles of democracy but also because of possible coup accusations. 
The final overall effect of the trials was to disturb the unity of the armed forces and its 
promotional patterns. The High Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, YAŞ) meetings, which 
decide on personnel appointments and promotions, began to be controlled by the government 
after August 2010, when the chief of the staff resigned due to a dispute over the court cases 
(Hürriyet 2016b). From this YAŞ meeting onwards, positions that were vacated as a result of 
purges in the military following the coup investigations were filled by alleged Gülen 
affiliates, who played critical roles on the night of 15 July. According to one calculation, for 
instance, among the 46 names that were promoted from colonel to brigadier admiral in the 
navy between 2010 and 2015, 23 of them were implicated in the putsch. In other words, half 
of those who were promoted in the middle ranks are now either arrested or are fugitives. This 
outcome occurred in a context where around 140 navy colonels were bypassed because they 
were suspects especially in the Balyoz and espionage cases (Ergin 2016a). A similar situation 
also occurred in the air force. An overview of the 2012 promotions, for instance, shows that 
only two of the nine colonels that were promoted to brigadier general were not later 
implicated in the 15 July attempt (Ergin 2016b). 
Based on these numbers, arguably the cases cleared the path for some Gülenist 
officers in the middle ranks by phasing out possible secularist officers. The evidence also 
indicates that the dominance of the secularists in the upper and middle ranks of the armed 
forces was broken.  In short, the trials changed the military in fundamental ways preparing 
the path for the coup outcome. 
 
New Laws on Intelligence, the Gendarmerie and the Police  
 The conflict between the Gülen movement and the AKP also had consequences for 
the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) and police. Indeed, the 
struggle between the former allies became public in events that involved these security 
forces. On 17 December 2013 alleged Gülen prosecutors began a corruption investigation 
that implicated government ministers. Next month, the prosecutor’s office stopped trucks 
supposedly carrying arms to the Syrian rebels. The gendarmerie forces and the prosecutor’s 
office wanted to search the trucks, but MİT agents did not allow it (Hamsici 2017).  
 The involvement of MİT in the January truck raid proved that the intelligence agency 
had become a loyal security service of the AKP government in general and of then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan in particular. It was reported that the Chief of MİT, Hakan Fidan, who was 
previously Erdoğan’s private advisor, was taking independent action in the Middle East 
following the Arab uprisings and continuing to function as Erdoğan’s primary aide in foreign 
policy (Entous and Parkinson 2013; Ignatius 2013). At home, the activities of Fidan drew 
attention, when in September 2011, voice records of Fidan and another MİT official were 
revealed attending a meeting with the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) in Oslo two years earlier. Subsequently, in February 2012 the 
prosecutor responsible for investigating the activities of the alleged urban wing of the PKK, 
the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK), called Fidan and other 
MİT members to testify in the case (Ceyhan 2012). 
 The AKP government initially dodged the bullet by removing the Gülenist prosecutor 
from his position and dismissing or sending to remote parts of the country thousands of 
police officers. Within 10 days of the prosecutor’s attempt to investigate Fidan, the law on 
MİT was also changed by the parliament, requiring the approval of the prime minister to 
prosecute the chief of MİT. The new article was applied retrospectively to all continuing 
investigations, freeing Fidan from any possible trial (TBMM 2012). The quick reaction of the 
government demonstrated the special place that MİT had been accorded in Turkish domestic 
and foreign policy. 
 In April 2014, a new law concerning MİT, envisioning more comprehensive changes 
in the agency’s functions, was approved by parliament in order to prevent similar incidents 
occurring in the future. However, certain provisions of the law were criticized by opposition 
parties, human rights groups and other observers for creating an “intelligence state” and 
giving extraordinary powers to the agency (Hürriyet Daily News 2014). The duties of MİT 
were expanded so that the agency would be responsible for matters involving national 
defence, the fight against terrorism and national security. In these matters, the agency was 
given the right to secretly collect, analyse and record data from any individual or institution, 
including tapping phone calls. In addition, anyone who published leaked information 
regarding MİT officials and the agency’s activities could receive prison sentences up to 10 
years (TBMM 2014).  
 The MİT was not the only security sector institution that came under the spotlight 
following the AKP’s altercation with the Gülen movement. In March 2015, the parliament 
passed an internal security package, with the intention of strengthening the hands of law 
enforcement agencies (TBMM 2015). The gendarmerie, which functions as a police force in 
rural areas, came under the authority of the ministry of interior more than the military. 
Although this might be seen as a positive development from the perspective of civil-military 
relations, the fact that governors would be able to oversee and determine the promotion and 
appointment of gendarmerie personnel suggested that the forces might be used to repress the 
opposition. It was also argued that one of the main purposes of the package was to prevent 
the gendarmerie being used by the judiciary in a possible attack against the interests of the 
government, as happened during the search of the MİT trucks in 2014 (Toker 2015).  
Another set of articles in the internal security package changed laws related to the 
duties and authorities of the police. The articles raised serious concerns over basic democratic 
rights, such as taking part in peaceful organisations and freedom of speech.  Some of the 
controversial articles in the law included the extensive discretion granted to the police in 
searching people and vehicles without a warrant, in using firearms and in the detention of 
individuals, as well as the possibility of prosecuting citizens for participation in public 
demonstrations and rallies (BBCTürkçe 2015; HRW 2014). The government also tried to 
cleanse the institution from opposition forces. Following the 2013 graft probe, 3,785 police 
officers were dismissed from their posts (Bulur and Çakmak 2016). 
Overall, in the period following 2013 and up until 2016, the AKP government was in 
an all-out war against its previous ally, the Gülen movement. The government tried to cleanse 
the police of Gülen sympathizers while it held the MİT close, attempted to control the 
gendarmerie and advance individuals loyal to the regime in all security sector institutions. 
The final plan of action before the 15 July coup attempt was to purge Gülenist officers from 
the armed forces in the upcoming YAŞ meeting scheduled for August.    
 
The Coup  
As one of the most critical turning points in Turkish history, the 15 July attempt was 
carried out because secularists in the military lost their dominance and the unity of the armed 
forces was damaged through the promotions of Gülenists, especially to prominent middle 
ranks. But segments of the military top brass, as well as the MİT and the majority of the 
police services, had become pro-government through these changes and it was their anti-coup 
stance that ultimately caused the attempt to fail. 
The putsch started at around 22:00 on 15 July when jets started to fly low in Ankara 
and the passages from the Anatolian to the European sides of Istanbul’s two bridges were 
blocked by tanks. The coup officially came to an end at 11:00 the next morning when the 
First Army Commander Ümit Dündar, who had been appointed during the night as the 
standing Chief of Staff, declared that the coup was repelled.2 Critical moments during this 13-
hour period were observed by anyone who witnessed the events from their homes around 
Turkey. The first acknowledgment that a coup was taking place came from Prime Minister 
Binali Yıldırım, when he called TV channels approximately one hour after the first incidents 
started. This was followed by the reading of the putschists’ manifesto on the state-run TV 
channel at around midnight. Although at that moment the coup-plotters seemed to have the 
upper hand, things began to change after President Erdoğan appeared in a live broadcast on 
CNN Turk through FaceTime and called on citizens to go out on the streets to defend 
democracy. Following his appearance, prayers began to be heard from mosques all around 
the country, continuing throughout the night and the next morning. Meanwhile, opposition 
party leaders declared their disapproval of the coup and the national assembly met at 01:40 to 
show its unified stance against the coup. This led to the bombing of the parliament several 
times during the night, causing parliamentarians from various parties to go the shelter of the 
parliament and broadcasting live from there. At 03:20, President Erdoğan’s plane landed at 
Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which was being taken back from the putschists by thousands of 
citizens who had replied to his earlier call. President Erdoğan held a press briefing at the 
airport signalling the failure of the coup. Gradually putschist soldiers began surrendering 
everywhere and for most observers the coup came to an end when the symbolic Boğaziçi 
Bridge was taken over by citizens at 06:42. 
The narration of the coup plot beyond these critical events that everyone was able to 
observe is difficult (Taş 2018). Questions regarding who gave the order for the coup and 
who was its military leader are still controversial. Shortly after the events began to unfold, 
government officials declared that the putsch was organized by the Gülen movement. This 
scenario became the most dominant account of the coup, and public opinion has converged 
on the view that Gülenists, now designated a terrorist organization by the Turkish state 
(Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ), were the only culprits. One of the most concrete pieces 
of evidence that connects the coup with the Gülenists is the capturing of five civilians and 
their security camera videos from the night of the coup at the Akıncı Air Base, which 
functioned as the headquarters of putsch. Background information on these individuals ties 
them to the Gülen movement and it is alleged they visited Gülen personally several times in 
Pennsylvania, including a few days before the coup.3 A visit that took place in January 2016 
by one of the suspects was verified with the information the US Department of Homeland 
Security shared with the Turkish law enforcement agencies in September 2017 (Ergin 
2017c). 
Gülen himself has rejected his movement’s association with the coup (Gülen 2017). 
His denial, as well as the increasingly heavy-handed and authoritarian manner in which the 
government is handling matters, convinces some that the Gülenists were not behind the 
attempt. From this perspective, evidence could have been planted or confessions of some of 
the suspects might have been extracted through threats or torture. The AKP government is 
also in a tight spot because of its track record with previous coup plots, such as the Balyoz 
case, and the damage that has been caused to the rule of law in the last decade. Although 
public opinion in Turkey in the aftermath of the coup was persuaded that FETÖ carried out 
this heinous act in a last-ditch effort to prevent its affiliates from being dismissed from the 
armed forces, Turkey’s NATO allies, such the USA and European powers, are not convinced 
(Rettman 2017; Aydıntaşbaş 2017). 
There are also other controversies regarding the coup plot involving the security 
sector actors. According to the indictment, at 14:20 on 15 July, a major, who confessed being 
a former Gülenist and serving at the army aviation command post, informed MİT of the 
upcoming coup. In turn, MİT reported the tip off to the general staff and Hakan Fidan held a 
private meeting with the Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar. The only concrete action 
that came out of this meeting seems to be Akar’s order for Land Forces Commander Salih 
Zeki Çolak to inspect the command post. Akar also closed Turkish air space to military 
flights for the day. Both orders of the chief of staff were obviously futile in preventing the 
coup, but they were still significant in alarming the plotters to take action in the early hours of 
the night, rather than at 3:00 as scheduled (CNNTurk 2017). This rearrangement caused 
major weaknesses for the pustchists and is one of the reasons why the plot failed.  
However, there is controversy over whether MİT could have done more to prevent the 
coup. It is also unclear why MİT, which was supposed to be the most loyal security 
institution, did not inform the government of the impending danger, leaving the prime 
minister and president to narrowly escape. Based on this, there are suspicions that there might 
be more behind the official story. The main opposition Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhurriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) has, for instance, suggested that this was “a controlled 
coup,” known by the government beforehand but allowed to play out in order to reveal and 
repress the Gülenists (Birgün 2017; Cumhuriyet 2017). 
Notwithstanding this alternative scenario, it is clear that the coup ultimately failed 
because of the actions of anti-coup forces within the armed forces. The chief of staff and 
commanders were apprehended by the coup plotters, but the Commander of the First Army 
took over and announced on TV that the coup was illegal and would fail. These declarations 
of a top general, along with the announcements of Prime Minister Yıldırım, President 
Erdoğan and leaders of the opposition parties, prevented potential officers from joining the 
coup.4  
In many military units throughout the country, battles were also fought between 
various anti-coup and pro-coup individuals and groups. Similar conflicts were experienced in 
the air, with the Eskişehir combined air operations centre being the key bastion of the anti-
coup officers (Ergin 2017d, 2017e). Coup plotters targeted their own colleagues during these 
battles on the ground and in the air, while also opening fire on and bombing MİT and police 
headquarters in Ankara, despite the presence of civilians. The balance sheet of these battles 
was severe. 249 people were killed and 2,196 people were wounded that night. Most 
casualties were civilians while 63 of those who died were policemen and three were military 
personnel fighting against the putschists (Posta 2017). Additional causalities were also 
experienced on the side of the coup-plotters. According to Prime Minister Yıldırım’s 
declaration a month after the incident, 36 putschists were killed and 49 coup-plotters were 
apprehended wounded (İHA 2017). 
These battles of the night show that security sector institutions had indeed become the 
frontlines of political conflict as a legacy of the developments that took place over the 
previous decade. Counterfactual exercises lead to the conclusion that if Gülenists were not 
promoted and secular officers were not dismissed through Balyoz and other trials, the 15 July 
coup attempt would not have been staged. If the MİT had not informed the general staff of 
the possibility of a coup, the putschists would not have started their plans in the early hours of 
the night when millions of citizens were out in the busy centres of Istanbul and Ankara, and 
able to be mobilized. If thousands of Gülenists were still in the police forces, perhaps they 
would have also joined the coup shifting the balance in favour of the putschists. Likewise, if 
the majority of the armed forces, including the general staff, were not loyal to the regime, the 
entire force of the military might have been used against the government. In short, if the 
security sector changes of the previous decade had not been made, politics in Turkey would 
be very different today. 
 
The Aftermath of the Coup and Lessons Unlearned 
One of the first reactions of the government after the coup attempt was to declare a 
state of emergency (Olağanüstü Hal, OHAL) on 20 July 2016. OHAL has been extended 
seven times until being suspended in July 2018. Most government decisions, as well as 
purges from public institutions after July 2016 were carried out by presidential decrees based 
on OHAL rules. In one year, 50,510 people were arrested, including 8,815 police officers, 
169 generals/admirals and 7,098 military personnel from the rank of colonel down. 
Significant expulsions have also been carried out to dismiss people from public sector jobs, 
reaching almost 145,000 officials and 5,000 academics in one year (Hürriyet 2017). 
Not surprisingly, one of the institutions that has been affected the most by purges is 
the military. In one year, 150 generals/admirals and nearly 4,300 officers were dismissed out 
of total of around 7,600 military personnel that lost their posts (Diken 2017). These numbers 
are in accord with the official numbers of military personnel that participated in the coup and 
that was provided by the General Staff shortly after 15 July. 8,651 soldiers were suspected of 
having taken part in the attempt, which made up 1.5 percent of the armed forces. Included in 
these numbers were 2,885 (33 percent) conscripts and students, who were probably only 
following orders and unaware that they were participating in a coup (BBCTürkçe 2016). 
Involvement levels were highest among middle ranking officers, which gives credibility to 
the idea that the Balyoz and espionage trials were used to infiltrate these ranks. Among the 
220 brigadier generals, for instance, around 33 percent was accused of taking part in the coup 
whereas among the 70 major generals only 14 percent conspired in the putsch (Gürcan 2016a). 
The air force, which makes up 8 percent of the Turkish Armed Forces, constituted 23 percent 
of those who were purged (Diken 2017). This is also in line with the fact that the air force 
was involved in the coup more than the other services. 
There is no doubt that the purges will have long-term effects on the military. It was 
reported that there was a shortage of generals and pilots (Gürcan 2016b; Eş 2017), resulting in 
the readmission of a number of officers who were purged with the previous trials (Hürriyet 
2016c), and the mandatory recall of retired pilots (Gürcan 2017a). In the aftermath of the 2017 
YAŞ meeting, it also became clear that the government would be more involved with senior 
level military advancements (Selvi 2017), facilitated also by a new decree that allows for 
faster promotions (Gürcan 2017a). Overall, these decisions indicate that recruitment and 
promotion patterns will continue to be disrupted within the military and problems will 
continue in the unity of the armed forces. 
Another issue with the purges is that among the public all of those who were 
dismissed are being treated as FETÖ members. However, a direct link between a number of 
accused officers and the Gülen movement was not clearly established. This has led some 
commentators to argue that officers who had personal reasons or other ideological 
affiliations, such as secularists and Kemalists, also joined the coup along with the Gülenists 
(Gürcan 2016a; Cizre 2016). The overgeneralization of all suspects as FETÖ members repeats 
the mistake of previous coup trials. Everybody is tarred with the same brush, potentially 
leading to grievances that can be carried into the future among active service personnel. 
Aside from the purges, the government has also continued to introduce modifications 
to the security sector though three important sets of decrees. The first set of decrees (numbers 
668 and 669) were announced shortly after the coup with the aim of overhauling the military 
(Resmi Gazete 2016a, 2016b). Military high schools were closed down and substituted with 
civilian high schools. This allowed for graduates of regular and religious high schools to 
progress into a military career. War colleges were replaced by the National Defence 
University, which was then subsumed under the authority of the ministry of national defence.  
The land, navy and air forces were made responsible to the minister of defence while the 
general staff came under the direction of the president. This amendment weakened the 
general staff in terms of its authority over the commanders and allowed for the president and 
the prime minister to give direct orders to the heads of the forces. The autonomy of military 
hospitals was also cancelled, bringing them under the control of the ministry of health. 
Finally, some of the remaining responsibilities of the general staff regarding the gendarmerie 
and the coast guard were abolished and the ministry of interior’s authority over the services 
was increased (IISS 2017; Hürriyet 2016d). 
The second set of changes was introduced in August 2017 with decree number 694 
(Resmi Gazete 2017). With the new decree, MİT was brought under the control of the 
president, with the president absorbing all the powers of the prime minister that were 
introduced in 2012 and 2014. In this way, MİT continued to be responsible to Erdoğan 
himself, first as the prime minister and now as president. The decree also established that the 
National Intelligence Coordination Board, which oversees the activities of ministries and 
state institutions on intelligence matters, is chaired by the president. Following the coup 
attempt, the general staff and MİT blamed each other for the intelligence gap. MİT cited its 
inability to enter military units as a reason, while the general staff argued that it had no 
control over its personnel once they left their stations (Ergin 2017). The new decree resolved 
the matter in favour of MİT and the agency was given unequivocal authority to carry out 
intelligence activities within the armed forces. The autonomy of the military in the judiciary 
was eradicated as well. All military courts were abolished, except for magistrates dealing 
with discipline crimes during war times. A final provision of the decree dealing with the 
security sector was the creation of around 30,000 new posts in the police services (Gürcan 
2017a). 
The third set of decrees was announced in July 2018 after the general elections and 
shortly before OHAL was suspended (Cumhuriyet 2018). The decrees changed the 
composition of YAŞ, increased the number of civilian government officials in the meetings 
and brought it under the control of the president. The general staff also came under the 
ministry of defence, but the president received the power to give direct orders to the general 
staff and commanders, who are now obligated to follow the orders immediately. It was also 
reiterated that the commanders and the general staff were separately responsible to the 
minister of defence. Although bringing the military under the ministry of defence is a 
requirement of any civilian regime, the current minister is the former chief of the general staff 
during the coup, Hulusi Akar. This is the first military officer in the position since the 1960 
coup and after 32 civilian ministers (Gazetevatan 2018).  The changes that have taken place 
in the security sector since the coup attempt resemble the amendments that were made since 
2008. As naturally expected, large scale purges and trials are taking place in the military and 
the autonomy of the armed forces in several areas is being curbed further. At the same time, 
there is a chance for senior level promotions to be based on political criteria. The same 
pattern is expected to be followed in the police services, as well as MİT, which has also been 
anchored to the presidency with more internal security duties.  
Similar strategies of civilianizing the security sector by bringing it under the 
monopoly of the government did not prevent the 15 July coup attempt. Rather than keeping 
the security sector on a short leash, a longer-term coup-proofing strategy should entail the 
creation of a liberal democratic legal framework, where not only the presidency, but also the 
parliament, civil society organizations and an independent judiciary would have oversight 
and control functions.5 Despite the horrors of the coup experience, this unfortunately seems 
to be a lesson that has not yet been learned. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the security sector has been on the agenda of the Turkish 
government since it first won the elections in 2002. Since 2007, this has been the main area 
of contestation between the secularists, the AKP government and the Gülen movement. The 
costs of this conflict have been dire for the entire country and for many who were killed, for 
hundreds of individuals, who have been wrongly accused of plotting coups in the last decade 
and imprisoned, and thousands who have been purged from their duties. It is clear that the 
policies that have been followed in the armed forces, the intelligence agency and police have 
not increased the security of the citizens, the government or the president. It is also clear that 
the security sector will continue to take centre stage and will continue to hold the key to the 
future of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. 
 
Notes   
 
1 For an overview of the Turkish military in politics, see (Hale 1994). 
2 Most of the chronology of the events is based on the author’s personal notes. For alternatives, see 
(Hürriyet Daily News 2016; 15 Temmuz Dosyası 2018). 
 
3 For an overview of the evidence based on the indictments, see the series of 21 editorials written by 
Sedat Ergin, with the name “15 Temmuz ve Akıncı Üssü” in Hürriyet. The first editorial was published 
by Ergin (2017a) and the last one by Ergin (2017b). 
4 For the importance of such signalling, see (Singh 2014). 
5 For the difference between “civilianization through monopolization” and “civilianization through 
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